Notes on Ernest Nagel’s Philosophy of History: Historical Determinism Revisited

Alexander Maar

doi:10.15848/hh.v15i40.1869

Autores

Alexander Maar Universidade Estadual de Londrina https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8336-7884

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15848/hh.v15i40.1869

Palavras-chave:

Philosophy of history, Historical explanation, Positivist history

Resumo

In this article, I analyse common arguments raised against historical determinism. I refer to the treatment given to the topic by Ernest Nagel in “Determinism in History” (1959). Nagel identifies five different arguments which allegedly show that history is not deterministic and argues that they fall short. I revisit, re-evaluate, and make amendments to these arguments. Special attention is given to one of them: The argument that the emergence of novelties in human affairs would be incompatible with the standard view of determinism. I use the theory of convergent evolution to clarify why novelties cannot be used against the deterministic assumption, especially if by determinism we mean only the ontological sense of the doctrine – which I call uniqueness of evolution – and not predictive determinism. I conclude that common attacks on the possibility of historical determinism are grounded on incomplete human knowledge of the historical world.

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Biografia do Autor

Alexander Maar, Universidade Estadual de Londrina

Doutor em filosofia analítica pela Universidade de Auckland (Nova Zelândia), com uma tese sobre a aplicação do conceito de causalidade contrafactual na resolução de problemas em filosofia da história. Tese selecionada pelo ICHTH Doctoral Dissertation Prize for the History and Theory of Historiography como uma das três melhores no triênio 2015-17. Mestre em filosofia pela UFSC, licenciado em filosofia pela Universidade de Trento (Itália), e bacharel e licenciado em história pela UDESC. Faz pesquisa na área de filosofia e teoria da história, e filosofia da ciência. É professor colaborador no departamento de filosofia da UEL.

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